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A B S T R A C T   
A new technique for the assessment of Team Situation Awareness (TSA) accuracy based upon post task Critical 
Decision Method structured interviews was developed and tested using 39 combat-ready F/A-18 pilots. Pilots 
undertook a number of simulated air combat scenarios, flying in flights of four aircraft against a formation of 
enemy aircraft. Results showed a strong curvilinear relationship where high TSA accuracy resulted in higher 
performance in some areas of air combat, measured with friendly losses and kills. There were diminishing returns 
in performance as TSA accuracy increased. This may explain why previous studies on air combat have found 
relatively weak relationships between situation awareness and performance where the relationship has been 
assumed to be linear.   
1. Introduction 
Situation awareness (SA) has replaced traditional ‘rudder and stick’ 
skills as the dominant success factor in air combat (Endsley, 1995; 
Svenmarckt and Dekker, 2003). SA is often defined as a hierarchical 
three-level construct of a person’s perception of the current situation (SA 
level 1), comprehension of the current situation (SA level 2) and pre-
diction of near future events (SA level 3) (Endsley, 1995). 
SA as a concept can be controversial. For example, Dekker and 
Hollnagel (2004) have described the concept as a ‘folk model’ and 
adopted a reductionist approach suggesting that SA could be decom-
posed into measurable, specific components (e.g., decision-making, 
perception, understanding, and long-term memory). They also argued 
that it was immune to falsification (see also Flach, 1995). Even if it is 
accepted that SA actually exists, the scientific nature of the concept is 
open to debate. For example, does it reside within the cognition of the 
user or is it an emergent property of the wider system, and what is the 
most appropriate approach to its measurement (for more details, see the 
extensive reviews by Salmon et al., 2008; Endsley, 2015; Stanton et al., 
2017; Nguyen et al., 2019)? Nevertheless, it is evident that the concept 
of SA has become an important metric in the evaluation of systems and 
human performance. As Wickens (2008) noted “… one can speak to the 
increased use of the construct in both theory and applications as testimony to 
its viability, as well as note that such strong criticism is also an index of the 
value of the SA concept to human factors science” (p. 401). 
Fighter aircraft are typically operated as a flight, which is a standard 
fighting unit comprised of two sections, each with two pilots. While 
every pilot within a flight has his/her own SA about the air combat 
situation, the flight has also a collective Team SA (TSA). While high SA is 
related to good performance in this context, it cannot simply be inferred 
that success in combat is a direct result of high SA. The relationship 
between performance, workload and SA is a complex one. The rela-
tionship may either be relatively weak (e.g., Fracker, 1991; Endsley 
et al., 2000; Strybel et al., 2008; Endsley, 2019) or complex and unclear 
(Durso et al., 1998: Sulistyawati et al., 2009; Mansikka et al., 2019a; 
Joffe and Wiggins, 2020). When assessing performance in such a 
context, both outcome and process measures should be considered 
(Mansikka et al., 2019b, 2019c, 2020). In a highly dynamic, uncertain 
environment such as air combat, success may occasionally be a product 
of chance factors and vice versa. As a result, there is a practical need to 
estimate reliably a flight’s TSA in air combat, as understanding the TSA 
can help in separating competent teams with high TSA from lucky ones 
with low TSA. An estimate of TSA has also an impact on evaluating 
training interventions and as well as on the evaluation and comparison 
of the utility of tactical operating procedures, the competence of teams 
and/or the applicability of aircraft systems. 
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TSA is more complex than individual SA. Endsley (1995) argued that 
for the flight to meet its goals, the flight members required the necessary 
SA for those factors relevant for their specific duties. The major chal-
lenge to achieve good TSA is the coordination of team members. Salmon 
et al. (2008) went further, suggesting that TSA had other aspects to it, 
including SA of individual team members, their shared SA and what they 
described as the ‘common picture’, the combined SA of the whole team. 
In this case, the focus was upon the measurement of the shared aspect of 
TSA, what Harris (2011) described as ‘overlapping’ SA; those common 
SA elements a team must share for effective performance. 
1.1. Assessing TSA 
TSA has been assessed in several dynamic, high-risk environments 
using a number of approaches. Early approaches (e.g., Wellens, 1993) 
inferred TSA from performance in a civilian command and control task, 
although measures of SA were later supplemented by post-trial review 
structured interviews using specific memory probes. It was noted that 
high SA was not necessarily related to high performance. It was observed 
that if it took too long to develop SA, this could be at the cost of not 
undertaking other actions associated with good performance, hence the 
cost of developing high TSA outweighed its performance benefits. 
Fowlkes et al. (1994) in a study of US helicopter crews, also used an 
approach to assess TSA based upon observed behaviors. Amongst other 
teamworking categories, pre-determined team behaviors indicative of 
TSA were defined a priori to specific task events. Subject matter expert 
(SME) observers then scored team performance on the basis of the 
presence or absence of these behaviors in a teamwork scenario. Both 
these approaches had the advantages of not intruding on task perfor-
mance, but both also only inferred the degree of TSA achieved from 
observed behaviors. 
Gorman et al. (2006) described the theoretical development and 
initial application of a TSA measure (Coordinated Awareness of Situa-
tion by Teams - CAST) based upon the retrospective analysis of a number 
of military incidents where SA was ‘lost’. Its proactive application in a 
simulated unmanned air vehicle reconnaissance experiment involving a 
distributed team is described in Gorman et al. (2005). This approach also 
used an observer-based assessment paradigm, however, it was some-
what less structured and prescriptive, as it was argued that complex, 
dynamic situations do not present pre-defined events to assess. It was, 
however, predicated upon the assumption that TSA was mostly chal-
lenged when teams faced ‘unlikely events requiring adaptive and timely 
team-level solutions’ or ‘roadblocks’. TSA was evaluated when such 
‘roadblocks’ were encountered (e.g., the failure of a communication 
system). The measurement process did not intrude on team performance 
but was not applicable in ‘normal’ operations. 
Endsley (1998) has adopted a different method based upon the 
SAGAT (Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique) approach 
used to assess individual SA. This approach is only applicable to simu-
lations (see, e.g., Falkland and Wiggins, 2019; Krampell et al., 2020) as it 
requires the researcher to freeze the scenario at pre-determined points to 
probe individual team members with structured queries concerning the 
current and future states of the system in order to assess their over-
lapping SA (Bolstad and Endsley, 2003). TSA is assessed from the ac-
curacy of team responses to SA probes, with more team members 
responding correctly being indicative of higher TSA. 
However, there are challenges in the measurement of TSA in a dy-
namic air combat context. Techniques based around approaches such as 
that proposed by Cooke et al. (1997), Bolstad and Endsley (2003) and 
Sulistyawati et al. (2009) require pausing the activity for a time to 
collect the data, something which is not always possible, especially 
during a live exercise. Furthermore, Salmon et al. (2009) have criticized 
the validity of this approach suggesting that it is unclear if it is SA or 
recall memory being assessed. In addition to measures of SA, Sulistya-
wati et al. (2009) also used combat performance measures to assess TSA 
effectiveness, however, as noted earlier, this can be a misleading 
measure as there is often a dissociation between SA and performance 
(Mansikka et al., 2019a). 
Self- and peer-appraisal techniques (see, e.g., Weigl et al., 2020) on 
the other hand, are not intrusive, but may reflect confidence rather than 
TSA (Lichacz, 2006) or knowledge (Prince et al., 2007). Fowlkes et al. 
(1994), Salas et al. (1995), Bolstad and Endsley (2003) and Gorman 
et al. (2006) all argue that TSA is a product of teamwork. Therefore, they 
essentially claim that an assessment of teamwork behavior is the best 
approach for the evaluation of the process of gaining TSA, rather than 
for its evaluation as a product or an emergent state. Rosenman et al. 
(2018) utilised an approach to the assessment of TSA based upon 
post-task probes of 3 level SA. SA was based upon the response accuracy 
to these questions: the TSA metric was determined by averaging the 
pairwise agreement for each dyad in the team. 
1.2. SA as knowledge 
A fighter pilots’ knowledge is stored in, and transferred between, 
long term memory (LTM) and working memory (WM) (Atkinson and 
Shiffrin, 1968; Wickens, 1991). Knowledge in LTM is organised in the 
form of mental models (MMs), which are a collective name for the 
structure and content of the pilots’ knowledge regarding the air combat 
environment and the sequence of activities of their tasks (Gilbert, 2011; 
Wilson and Rutherford, 1989). In this paper, an attribute refers to the 
smallest unit within the air combat environment that the pilots can have 
knowledge of, whereas a concept is a functional collective of attributes 
(Langan-Fox et al., 2000). For example, a non-friendly aircraft is a 
concept with position and type as its attributes. 
Knowledge in WM is based on activated MMs which pilots use to 
reason and to comprehend the air combat environment (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). When the activated MMs are updated with observations, the 
resulting dynamic knowledge is often referred to as SA (Endsley, 1995, 
2000, 2019). SA is fundamentally the pilot’s knowledge of what s/he 
thinks is happening now and in the near future, as opposed to what is 
actually happening and what will be really happening (Endsley, 1993; 
Wickens et al., 2004), i.e., the ‘ground truth’. 
1.3. TSA as collective knowledge 
The collective knowledge possessed by a flight has been inter-
changeably referred to as shared knowledge (Hecker, 2012), team 
mental model (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994; van der Haar et al., 
2015), shared cognition (Cooke et al., 2000), TSA (Cooke et al., 2001), 
team situation model (Cooke et al., 2017) and shared understanding 
(Johnson & O’Connor, 2008). TSA is the flight members’ collective SA 
regarding the attributes relevant for a flight. 
There are numerous definitions for TSA in the literature. Endsley 
(1995) defined TSA as ‘the degree to which every team member pos-
sesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities’ (Endsley, 1995; p. 
39). Salas et al. (1995) suggested that ‘TSA is at least in part the shared 
understanding of a situation among team members at one point in time’. 
Wellens (1993) defined it as ‘the sharing of a common perspective be-
tween two or more individuals regarding current environmental events, 
their meaning and projected future status’. However, all definitions 
encompass shared SA (Harris, 2011). Shared SA is underpinned by ele-
ments of a common mental model of the flight combined with an 
appreciation of the flight members’ individual responsibilities. TSA 
builds upon the concept of Transactive Memory (Wegner, 1985) which 
proposes that a memory system comprised of a group of people is more 
complex and effective than its individual constituents. Salas et al. (2005) 
argued that TSA was based upon the information exchange required for 
the mission which determined individual tasks and roles. Therefore, TSA 
was the result of the interactions of individual SA (q.v. Rogers, 1997). As 
a result of the complex interaction between individuals’ SA and the 
processes by which SA is shared, several authors have suggested that 
TSA cannot be adequately described using a reductionist perspective as 
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it is more than the sum of its component parts (Fiore et al., 2012; Stanton 
et al., 2017). Gorman et al. (2006) concluded that ‘TSA is beyond the 
scope of adding up operators’ private awareness of the situation and is 
predicated on operator interaction’ (p. 1320). This view is entirely 
consistent with the macrocognitive perspective adopted in the study of 
transactive memory and distributed cognition – both approaches con-
taining more and better information that any one person could access. 
Rogers (1997) developed this further describing the generic properties 
of cognition in people working as a team. She suggested that a team has 
properties over and above those of the individuals making up a team. For 
example, the knowledge possessed by team members is highly variable 
and redundant, and distribution and access to information promotes 
coordinated action. Teams engage in interactions allowing them to pool 
their cognitive resources, they share knowledge through both formal 
and implicit communication, and from prior knowledge of each other. 
One agent may compensate for degradation in SA in another (Stanton 
et al., 2006). As a result, when adopting such a macrocognitive approach 
the emphasis in analysis changes away from the individual to that of the 
collective properties and performance of the team. A more holistic 
perspective is required. Endsley and Jones (2001) developed a model of 
TSA comprising four necessary components to support it. The model 
comprised 1) Requirements (the information and goals that need to be 
shared); 2) Devices (methods to share this information); 3) Mechanisms 
(the devices to aid in developing TSA) and 4) Processes (the formal 
processes for sharing information, verifying understanding, prioritising 
tasks and establishing contingencies). 
The flight uses TSA to describe, explain and predict the progress of 
the air combat, and to recognise and select appropriate tactics, tech-
niques and procedures (TTPs) (Rouse and Morris, 1986). TTPs are rules 
which, when followed, create discipline and provide structure to an 
otherwise unpredictable and chaotic activity (Rajabally et al., 2009). 
Accurate TSA is an essential contributor to the performance of a flight 
(Converse et al., 1991; Langan-Fox et al., 2004). TSA accuracy refers to 
the level of agreement between the flight members’ SA regarding the 
attributes and the objective reality (the ground truth). 
When TSA is considered as collective knowledge, estimation of TSA 
essentially becomes a knowledge elicitation task. Knowledge elicitation 
is a ‘component of knowledge acquisition in which information per-
taining to the reasoning and other thought processes needed to perform 
a job is obtained from a human source’ (Fowlkes et al., 1994). There 
exists a strong research tradition in the field of knowledge elicitation, 
which provides alternative approaches to estimate collective knowl-
edge, or TSA, in an air combat context (see, e.g., Cooke et al., 2000; 
Hoffman et al., 1998; Hoffman et al., 1995; Cooke, 1994; Klein et al., 
1989). 
1.4. Aims and objectives 
The aims of this paper were twofold: firstly, to describe the rela-
tionship between the accuracy of TSA and performance of a flight in air 
combat missions of increasing levels of cognitive demand required to 
develop and maintain TSA, and secondly to overcome the requirement 
to interrupt the task during the time when data are collected. Once an 
estimate of the flight’s TSA accuracy in a natural air combat environ-
ment had been obtained, the objective of this paper was to provide a 
novel explanation for the frequently observed dissociation between 
performance, measured using friendly losses and kills, and TSA. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes how the TSA accuracy measurement technique was developed. 
Section 2.1 illustrates how the TSA concepts and attributes were iden-
tified and Section 2.2 describes how the pilots’ knowledge is elicited. 
Section 2.3 explains how TSA accuracy is estimated. Sections 3 dem-
onstrates the use of the TSA accuracy measurement technique in a real- 
life setting, followed by the associated results in Section 4 and discussion 
in Section 5. 
2. TSA accuracy measurement technique 
2.1. Attribute development 
Estimating the flight’s TSA accuracy in a beyond visual range (BVR) 
air combat mission is essentially about determining their knowledge 
about the relevant attributes within this air combat environment. To 
develop a TSA accuracy measurement technique that could be used 
across different live and virtual BVR missions, it was necessary to 
ascertain which concepts and attributes were relevant in a typical BVR 
mission. This was carried out using a phased technique based upon that 
used by Langan-Fox et al. (2000, 2004) and Johnson et al. (2007). 
First, some 200 research articles (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO), 1995; Endsley and Garland, 1995; Gilson et al., 1994; 
Endsley, 1993), technical reports (e.g., Vidulich et al., 1994; Fracker, 
1991) and air force manuals (e.g., Korean Air Force, 2005; Royal Nor-
wegian Air Force, 2001) were reviewed. Relevant material was searched 
using Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com), and the search fa-
cilities of the NATO Science and Technology Organization (http 
s://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx) and Defence Technical In-
formation Center (https://discover.dtic.mil). Based on this review and 
an analysis of the flight’s BVR task, an initial list of 298 relevant con-
cepts and attributes was formed. The initial list of concepts and attri-
butes was reviewed by experienced instructor pilots (IPs) who 
shortlisted a list of concepts and attributes by removing duplicates and 
combining the remaining items into meaningful units. The content 
validity of the resulting potential list was evaluated by operational test 
and evaluation (OT&E) pilots. Next, 61 combat ready F/A-18 pilots 
(mean age 32.6 years, SD = 3.7) were recruited from two fighter 
squadrons to rate the attributes. All pilots were volunteers and were not 
paid for the rating task. The pilots rated each attribute in the potential 
list based on how important it was for the flight members to have an 
accurate knowledge about the attribute. Ratings were conducted with 
respect to a typical BVR mission. Ratings ranged from ‘1’ (low impor-
tance) to ‘7’ (high importance). To make the rating scale more mean-
ingful for the pilots, the ratings were given verbal descriptions and 
structured into a hierarchical rating aid based around the format of the 
Cooper-Harper rating scale, shown in Fig. 1 (Cooper and Harper, 1969). 
Eleven experienced weapons instructors and operational test pilots 
reviewed the ratings and produced a final list of concepts and attributes. 
The final list was organised hierarchically such that there were seven 
top-level concepts, each consisting of several further attributes. Table 1 
summarises the final list. The concepts and attributes were selected and 
formulated such that they were platform independent. 
2.2. Post-sortie interview method 
An interviewer determines TSA accuracy during structured in-
terviews in the post sortie debrief. During the debrief, an IP reconstructs 
the mission using facilities such as cockpit video recordings, aircraft’s 
simulated flight trajectories, sensor tracks, and the weapon simulations 
of all participating aircraft. Due to its comprehensiveness, the recon-
struction is often referred to as the ‘ground truth’ of the mission (Waag 
and Houck, 1994). 
The ground truth is reviewed during the debrief. As the IP identifies a 
critical incident from the ground truth, the review is paused. A critical 
incident is defined as one which has direct flight safety implications, or 
which contributes to changes in the level of completion of the flight’s 
taskwork. A flight’s TTP selection decision and TTP execution are typical 
examples of taskwork related incidents. For a more detailed discussion 
about a flight’s taskwork, see Joint Chief of Staff (2013) and Mansikka 
et al. (2020). 
At this point, the execution of the debrief deviates slightly from its 
standard flow to accommodate the TSA elicitation probes. This aspect of 
the debrief is based upon a modified, shortened form of the Critical 
Decision Making (CDM) structured interview approach (see, Crandall 
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et al., 2006). The CDM interview is essentially a retrospective, 
semi-structured knowledge elicitation technique, which uses cognitive 
probes to extract experts’ SA. This is a similar approach to that used by 
Plant and Stanton (2015). 
The CDM interview to derive the data for the TSA accuracy assess-
ment has four phases: incident identification, timeline construction, 
deepening probes (to tap tacit knowledge) and ‘What if’ queries. Klein 
and Armstrong (2004) recommend tailoring the deepening probes to 
meet the specific research objectives. Therefore, novel probes were 
developed to support TSA elicitation in a natural air combat training 
environment. Table 2 describes these probes. 
IPs are trained to facilitate the CDM interview. All IPs taking part in 
the study need to be familiar with identifying critical incidents and 
open-ended questioning. Furthermore, they all must be briefed about 
the phases and objectives of the CDM interview, and the use of the 
deepening SA probes. 
At the first step, the IP introduces the incident and the first attribute 
associated to it (see Table 1). The pilot is asked if s/he has correctly 
perceived the attribute, i.e., if the pilot has SA level 1 about the attribute. 
Sometimes the correctness or incorrectness of the perception can be 
determined directly from the ground truth and there is no need for 
elaboration or deepening probes. For example, if information needed to 
form SA level 1 about the attribute is included in a radio call and the 
pilot provides a correct, positive acknowledgement to that radio call, it 
is clear that the pilot has SA level 1 for that attribute. However, deep-
ening probes are needed if the correct (or incorrect) perception cannot 
be unambiguously determined from the pilot’s behavior. 
Next, the pilot’s SA about the attribute’s meaning with respect to the 
situation at hand, i.e., SA level 2, is determined. To assist pilots in ver-
balising this aspect of SA, the IP draws heavily on the probes listed in 
Table 2. This is because SA about the attribute is not necessary realized 
as an observable behavior and the pilot’s SA about the attribute’s 
meaning may be tacit. Moreover, an observable behavior suggesting 
sufficient SA level 2 may be founded on insufficient or wrong SA about 
the ground truth. Based on the pilot’s responses to the deepening probes, 
the IP determines the pilot’s SA level 2. 
Finally, the pilot’s SA level 3 is established by using the deepening 
probes which motivate the pilot to compare and verbalise his/her ex-
pectations and the way the situation had evolved. It is not recommended 
to probe about the future status of the situation as by the time the probes 
are introduced, the pilot has not yet seen the ground truth of that situ-
ation. The only deepening probes which are explicitly forward looking, 
are the ones associated with contingencies. They are also the probes 
which are used to complete the fourth, ‘What if’, phase of the interview. 
Once the pilots’ SA levels 1–3 concerning the first attribute has been 
elicited, the procedure is repeated for all other attributes related to the 
same critical incident. Reviewing of the ground truth continues until the 
IP identifies the next incident, the debrief is paused and the CDM 
interview is re-initiated. This procedure is repeated until the pilot’s SA 
with respect to every critical incident contained within the ground truth 
has been elicited. The number of attributes to be probed and the number 
of probes to be used to elicit each attribute depend on the time available 
for the debrief and the desired comprehensiveness of the knowledge 
elicitation. 
Fig. 1. Attribute rating aid.  
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2.3. Determining TSA accuracy 
An estimation of the flight’s TSA accuracy for SA levels 1–3 utilise 
the pilots’ SA levels 1–3 determined during the post-sortie interview. 
After the pilots’ SA levels 1–3 with respect to an attribute have been 
obtained during the debrief, TSA accuracy scores for SA levels 1–3 are 
defined for that attribute. First, each pilot’s SA level 1–3 accuracy for the 
attribute is scored. Separate scores are determined for each SA level. 
Accurate SA level about an attribute is scored as ‘1’, whereas inaccurate 
SA is scored as ‘0’. Accurate SA means that a well-informed decision can 
be made based on that SA. The level of accuracy required to make a well- 
informed decision is dependent on the tactical situation. By summing 
the pilots’ SA level accuracy scores for an attribute, TSA level 1–3 ac-
curacy scores are obtained for that attribute. These scores can range 
from ‘0’ to ‘4’ for the flight. The procedure is repeated for every attri-
bute. Once the TSA level 1–3 accuracy scores have been obtained for 
every attribute, TSA level 1–3 accuracy indices are calculated by aver-
aging the TSA level 1–3 accuracy scores of the respective TSA levels. 
Finally, the TSA accuracy index of the flight is determined by averaging 
all TSA accuracy scores - which is essentially the same as averaging the 
TSA level 1–3 accuracy indices. 
3. Demonstration 
3.1. Participants 
Thirty-nine qualified F/A-18 fighter pilots participated in the simu-
lated air combat demonstration. All participants were male. The par-
ticipants’ average flight experience with F/A-18 aircraft was 543 flight 
hours (SD = 302) and they were all fit to fly. Written informed consent 
was obtained from each participant. A fighter controller was assigned for 
each flight, whose task was to support the flight according to the fighter 
controllers’ standard operating procedures. The fighter controller’s 
impact on flight’s TSA was not assessed. 
3.2. Apparatus 
For each mission, four flight training devices (FTDs) used for air 
combat training in the fighter squadrons were used. Two types of FTDs 
were used; one had a 216◦ field of view and a fully functional cockpit, 
whereas the other had limited cockpit functionality and a virtual reality 
headset with a 360◦ field of view. The fighter controller had access to a 
simulated ground-based radar picture of the operating area. The fighter 
controller’s workstation and the participants’ FTDs were networked, 
and all participants were able to communicate via radio and datalink. All 
enemy, or red, aircraft were computer generated simulation entities. 
They were programmed with ‘perfect SA’ and scripted to mimic typical 
red tactics used in western air combat exercises. 
3.3. Procedure 
3.3.1. Flying mission 
Participants were assigned into flights based on their training rosters. 
Once the flights were given their task, they conducted a standard 
mission brief and entered the FTDs. Each simulation consisted of a flight 
and red aircraft. The flight’s task was to intercept the red aircraft and the 
red aircraft were programmed to intercept the flight. Before the simu-
lation was started, the flight and the red aircraft were initialised at their 
designated starting positions, speeds and altitudes. The red presentation 
in each mission placed equal cognitive demand on pilots. However, the 
cognitive demand required to develop and maintain TSA was manipu-
lated between missions by varying the functionality of the datalink 
which is the fundamental means for building awareness of the tactical 
picture. With reference to Endsley and Jones’s (2001) model of the 
mechanisms underpinning TSA, the datalink is a device which aids in 
building TSA and holds a partial representation of the tactical picture. 
The greater the functionality of the datalink was restricted, the more the 
pilots had to rely on radio communications and a shared appreciation of 
mission objectives and TTPs to build TSA. 
Three levels of cognitive demand required to develop and maintain 
TSA were used: high, medium, and low. In the low cognitive demand 
condition, the datalink was fully functional and enabled digital transfer 
Table 1 
Final list of concepts and attributes.   
Concepts 
Attributes 
Own flight/ Position 
flight members/ Flight parameters 
other friendly aircraft Offensive capabilities  
Defensive capabilities  
Limitations  
Objectives  
Tasks (kill and live chains)  
TTPs  
Weapon effects  
Electronic warfare effects 
Non-friendly aircraft Position  
Types  
Offensive capabilities 
Defensive capabilities  
Targeted/untargeted statuses  
Declarations  
Objectives  
Tactics and manoeuvres  
Weapon effects  
Electronic warfare effects 
Friendly and Position 
non-friendly forces Types 
(other than aircraft) Offensive capabilities  
Defensive capabilities  
Limitations  
Activity  
Electronic warfare effects 
Environment Airspace restrictions (air coordination order)  
Terrain  
Meteorological conditions (visibility, rain, etc.)  
Table 2 
Deepening probes.  
Probe type Probe content 
Information What information were you seeking and from where?  
What information, if any, did you combine to gain the 
necessary information?  
How reliable was the source information?  
What information, if any, was missing or conflicting?  
What information, if any, did you misinterpret and how?  
Did the information change the way you understood the 
situation, and how? 
TTPs and options How well did the environmental cues match with TTPs?  
What feasible TTPs did you identify?  
What TTP did you select and why?/Would you have selected a 
different TTP than the one that was directed and why?  
If the TTP was directed to you, did you know what it was?  
What was your understanding about the flight’s TTP 
adherence and TTP progress?  
What contingency TTPs, if any, were you prepared to execute 
and why?  
What were the cues that you used as triggers for a contingency 
TTP and why? 
Goals, priorities What were your priorities during this incident and why?  
What were you trying to achieve and why? 
Physical/time 
demand 
If you experienced time/physical demand, how did it affect 
you? 
Limitations/alibies If you experienced perceptual/technical/cognitive limitations, 
what were they and how did they affect you? 
Expectations Compared to your expectations, how did the status of the 
attribute or the situation as a whole evolve?  
How did the mission brief prepare you for this incident?  
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of information between aircraft, and between aircraft and the fighter 
controller. In the medium demand condition, the datalink allowed in-
formation transfer only between aircraft. In the high demand condition, 
the datalink was disabled. In all conditions, the necessary information 
was available but just needed different mechanisms to share it to achieve 
TSA. Achieving a high TSA was possible, but cognitively demanding, 
even in the high cognitive demand condition where the datalink was 
disabled, and information normally transferred via datalink had to be 
transferred via radio. Two different missions were prepared for each 
cognitive demand condition. During each simulator session, the flights 
flew missions with all three levels of cognitive demand. Eleven flights 
flew each cognitive demand condition twice, i.e., six different missions. 
Due to time constraints, four flights flew each condition just once, i.e., 
three different missions. The order in which the different cognitive de-
mand conditions were introduced was randomised between the flights. 
Once the simulation was initiated, the mission was left to evolve freely 
until all red aircraft were destroyed, the flight was destroyed, or 10 min 
had elapsed. 
3.3.2. Data collection 
Once the simulation had ended, the mission was reconstructed and 
the debrief was initiated. The IP facilitated the debrief, determined the 
pilots’ SA levels and defined the TSA accuracy scores. In the debrief, the 
ground truth was reviewed, and it was paused each time the IP identified 
a critical incident – typically a decision point related to TTP selection. 
Once paused, the pilots’ SA levels 1–3 regarding the attributes associ-
ated with that incident were elicited. To assist the pilots’ recall, they 
were let to view, replay, zoom and rewind the ground truth at their will. 
Whenever the pilots’ SA was not clearly observable from their behavior, 
the IP used the deepening probes listed in Table 2 to determine their SA. 
Determination of SA levels 2 and 3 was particularly dependent on the 
use of the deepening probes. Once the pilots’ SA levels 1–3 for an 
attribute were obtained, TSA accuracy scores for SA levels 1–3 were 
defined by comparing the pilots’ SA about that attribute to the ground 
truth. The procedure was repeated for every critical incident and every 
attribute associated with those incidents. TSA level 1–3 accuracy indices 
and a TSA accuracy index were calculated from the TSA accuracy scores. 
The debriefs lasted less than 60 min. On average, the IP identified 73 
attributes during each debrief. 
4. Results 
The relationships between performance, measured with friendly 
losses and kills, TSA accuracy and cognitive demand were analysed. The 
unit of analysis was the flight (N = 15), not each individual pilot. 
4.1. Performance and TSA accuracy indices versus cognitive demand 
There was a significant difference observed in TSA accuracy indices 
with respect to the level of cognitive demand imposed by the mission 
(F2,13 = 473.562; p < 0.001; ηp2 = 0.971), see Table 3. All pairwise 
comparisons between the cognitive demand levels and the TSA accuracy 
index were significant (p < 0.001). In general, the TSA accuracy index 
declined as cognitive demand increased. 
There was also a significant difference observed in the number of 
friendly losses with respect to the level of cognitive demand (F2,13 =
6.168; p < 0.026; ηp2 = 0.306), see Table 3. However, the only significant 
pairwise comparison was between losses in the low and high cognitive 
demand missions. The difference in the number of kills with respect to 
cognitive demand was verging on significance (F2,13 = 4.249; p < 0.058; 
ηp2 = 0.233). No pairwise comparisons were significant. 
4.2. TSA accuracy index versus performance 
At all levels of cognitive demand, there was a highly significant 
negative curvilinear relationship between the TSA accuracy index and 
friendly losses (Low cognitive demand: R = 0.929; R2 = 0.863; R2adj =
0.841; F2,12 = 37.955; p < 0.001; Medium cognitive demand: R = 0.821 
R2 = 0.674; R2adj = 0.620; F2,12 = 12.428; p < 0.001; High cognitive 
demand: R = 0.724; R2 = 0.476; R2adj = 0.726; F2,12 = 7.353; p < 0.01). 
With friendly losses dependent upon the TSA accuracy index, the 
best fit models were all quadratic in nature (Low cognitive demand: 
Losses = TSA accuracy index*-56.899 + TSA accuracy index2 * 7.734 +
104.519; Medium cognitive demand: Losses = TSA accuracy index*- 
5.678 + TSA accuracy index2 * 0.849 + 9.549; High cognitive demand: 
Losses = TSA accuracy index*-7.581 + TSA accuracy index2 * 1.581 +
9.023). 
A higher TSA accuracy index was associated with fewer friendly 
losses at all levels of cognitive demand. However, the greatest benefits 
from TSA accuracy improvement accrued at lower levels of TSA accu-
racy and the return diminished as TSA accuracy improved. 
At the low level of cognitive demand, there was a significant curvi-
linear relationship between the TSA accuracy index and kills (Low 
cognitive demand: R = 0.659; R2 = 0.435; R2adj = 0.341; F2,12 = 4.613; 
p < 0.05). With kills dependent upon the TSA accuracy index, the best fit 
model was again quadratic in nature (Low cognitive demand: Kills =
TSA accuracy index* 57.558 + TSA accuracy index2 * − 8.287 – 93.472). 
There were no significant relationships between kills and the TSA ac-
curacy index in either the medium or high cognitive demand missions. 
Similar to the results for losses, the results with respect to kills in the low 
cognitive demand condition again showed a pattern of diminishing 
returns, with performance benefits reducing with increasing TSA 
accuracy. 
The significant regression results were further decomposed to 
investigate the relationship of TSA level 1–3 accuracy indices with 
performance. A series of stepwise multiple regressions (with p to enter 
set at <0.05 and p to exclude > 0.10) were performed to predict per-
formance from TSA levels 1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices. 
4.3. Low cognitive demand – Losses 
Table 4summarises the mean friendly losses and TSA level 1,2 and 3 
accuracy indices at low cognitive demand. All predictor variables, i.e., 
TSA accuracy indices of TSA levels 1, 2 and 3, correlated highly with the 
number of friendly losses. All TSA predictor variables were also highly 
inter-correlated (Table 5). 
In the low cognitive demand mission, only one predictor variable 
entered into the final regression equation, the TSA level 1 accuracy 
index, as a result of the high inter-correlations between the predictor 
variables. The resulting equation was, however, highly significant. 
There was a significant negative relationship between the friendly losses 
and TSA accuracy at level 1 (R = 0.830; R2 = 0.689; R2adj = 0.604; F3,11 
Table 3 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the TSA accuracy index, friendly 
losses and kills, broken down by the level of cognitive demand, N = 15.  
Cognitive demand TSA accuracy index Losses Kills  
M SD M SD M SD 
Low 3.54 0.22 0.40 0.69 6.40 0.60 
Medium 2.58 0.45 0.70 0.84 5.53 1.82 
High 1.72 0.44 0.97 1.16 5.57 1.59  
Table 4 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 
and 3 accuracy indices at low cognitive demand, N = 15.   
M SD 
Losses 0.40 0.69 
TSA level 1 3.67 0.21 
TSA level 2 3.63 0.23 
TSA level 3 3.33 0.29  
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= 8.113; p < 0.01). With friendly losses dependent upon TSA accuracy 
index, the equation for the best fit line was: Losses = TSA level 1 ac-
curacy index*-2.780 + 10.199. A similar pattern of results was observed 
in the medium and high cognitive demand missions. 
4.4. Medium cognitive demand - Losses 
Table 6summarises the mean friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 and 3 
accuracy indices at medium cognitive demand. Again, all predictor 
variables, i.e., accuracy indices of TSA levels 1, 2 and 3, correlated 
highly with the number of friendly losses (see Table 6). All predictor 
variables were also highly inter-correlated (Table 7). 
As before, in the medium cognitive demand mission, the only pre-
dictor that entered into the final regression equation was the TSA level 1 
accuracy index, but the resulting equation was highly significant. There 
was a significant negative relationship between friendly losses and the 
TSA level 1 accuracy index (R = 0.815; R2 = 0.664; R2adj = 0.572; F3,11 
= 7.235; p < 0.01). With friendly losses dependent upon the overall TSA 
accuracy index, the best fit line was: Losses = TSA level 1 accuracy 
index*-1.181 + 5.008. 
4.5. High cognitive demand – Losses 
With the exception of the TSA level 3 accuracy index in the high 
cognitive demand mission the two remaining predictor variables, i.e., 
the accuracy indices of TSA levels 1 and 2, correlated highly with the 
number of friendly losses (see Table 8). The remaining two TSA indices 
were highly inter-correlated (Table 9). 
In the high cognitive demand mission, once again the only significant 
predictor that entered into the regression equation was the TSA level 1 
accuracy index, but the resulting equation was significant. As before, 
there was a significant negative relationship between friendly losses and 
the TSA level 1 accuracy index (R = 0.726; R2 = 0.526; R2adj = 0.448; 
F3,11 = 6.670; p < 0.01). With friendly losses dependent upon the overall 
TSA accuracy index, the best fit line was: Losses = TSA level 1 accuracy 
index*-1.192 + 4.706. 
4.6. Low cognitive demand – kills 
There was a significant curvilinear relationship between kills and the 
TSA accuracy index in the low cognitive demand mission. However, 
when this relationship was decomposed further to look at the contri-
butions of TSA level 1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices, there was no significant 
multiple regression solution. 
5. Discussion 
Fifteen flights each of four F/A-18 fighter aircraft undertook simu-
lated BVR air combat missions which imposed three different levels of 
cognitive demand required to develop TSA. The cognitive demand was 
varied by manipulating the datalink-based exchange of information 
between the aircraft in the flight and the fighter controller (q.v. the 
approach used by Gorman et al., 2005; Gorman et al., 2006). Inhibiting 
the free flow of tactical information increased the cognitive demand. 
Overall, it was observed that as the cognitive demand required to 
develop and maintain TSA increased, TSA accuracy decreased, the 
number of friendly losses increased and the number of kills also tended 
to decrease (see Table 3). 
Studies have previously suggested that the relationship between SA 
and performance can be weak or unclear (e.g., Durso et al., 1998: 
Endsley et al., 2000; Endsley, 2019; Mansikka et al., 2019a) particularly 
in a highly dynamic, uncertain environment where success or failure can 
be a product of chance. Such studies examining the relationship between 
SA and performance have usually been predicated upon an implicit 
linear relationship (usually in the form of correlation/regression ana-
lyses – see, e.g., Endsley, 2019). R values reported were usually in the 
region of 0.2–0.5 (e.g., Fracker, 1991; Durso et al., 1998; Strybel et al., 
2008; Sulistyawati et al., 2009; Endsley, 2019) but may drop to as low as 
0.07 (Strybel et al., 2008). However, in the present study the results 
showed a strong curvilinear relationship between TSA accuracy and 
performance (based upon a quadratic regression solution) particularly 
when performance was measured by avoiding friendly losses. The 
relationship with performance dependent upon TSA accuracy in some 
cases accounted for over 85% of the variance. However, the gains in 
performance decreased disproportionately with increases in TSA accu-
racy, with the greatest gains in performance observed at lower TSA 
accuracy. The relationship between TSA accuracy and kills was much 
weaker and only reached significance in the low cognitive demand 
Table 5 
Correlations between friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices 
(predictors) and inter-correlations between predictor variables.   
Friendly losses (low cognitive demand) TSA level 1 TSA level 2 
TSA level 1 − 0.79**   
TSA level 2 − 0.73** 0.88**  
TSA level 3 − 0.66** 0.59* 0.81* 
N = 15; *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001. 
Table 6 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 
and 3 accuracy indices at medium cognitive demand, N = 15.   
M SD 
Losses 0.70 0.84 
TSA level 1 3.08 0.48 
TSA level 2 2.97 0.55 
TSA level 3 1.70 0.46  
Table 7 
Correlations between friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices 
(predictors) and inter-correlations between predictor variables.   
Friendly losses (medium cognitive 
demand) 




− 0.81***   
TSA level 
2 
− 0.80*** 0.98***  
TSA level 
3 
− 0.48* 0.63** 0.50* 
N = 15; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Table 8 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of friendly losses and TSA level 1, 2 
and 3 accuracy indices at high cognitive demand, N = 15.   
M SD 
Losses 0.97 1.16 
TSA level 1 2.71 0.58 
TSA level 2 2.42 0.78 
TSA level 3 0.00 0.00  
Table 9 
Correlations between friendly losses and TSA levels 1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices 
(predictors) and inter-correlations between predictor variables.   
Losses (high cognitive demand) TSA level 1 TSA level 2 
TSA level 1 − 0.72**   
TSA level 2 − 0.68* 0.91**  
TSA level 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N = 15; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 
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condition. 
An examination of the strategies employed by the members of the 
flight provides an explanation for this. At the beginning of each mission, 
the separation between the flight and the red aircraft provided enough 
time for the flight to find, fix and track the enemy aircraft with their 
onboard sensors. Once the enemy aircraft were declared as hostile, the 
flight attempted to intercept as many red aircraft as possible – often 
leading to a situation where a single red aircraft was targeted and 
engaged by more than one flight member. Due to the launch ranges and 
the speed profiles of the missiles used in the simulation, the flight 
typically had to defend against the red aircraft’s missiles before its own 
missiles had reached their targets. A flight’s most basic defensive 
manoeuvre was to turn away from the threat and to defeat the incoming 
missiles kinematically. When the flight re-engaged the remaining red 
aircraft after such a defensive manoeuvre, the range between the flight 
and the enemy aircraft was typically much less than it was at the 
beginning of the mission. Consequently, the flight did not have sufficient 
time to search again for the red aircraft with their onboard sensors. In 
low cognitive demand missions, the flight could use the datalink to 
maintain TSA about the red aircraft even while flying away from them, 
whereas in high cognitive demand missions the pilots had the start 
building their radar picture from scratch as they turned towards the red 
aircraft. The red (simulated enemy) aircraft, however, were pro-
grammed with ‘perfect SA’ and were able to engage the flight as soon as 
their missile launch ranges permitted. As a result, the cognitive demand 
manipulation to build TSA had a greater impact on the flight’s surviv-
ability after their initial defensive manoeuvre – whereas it had little or 
no effect on the number of red aircraft being intercepted before the first 
defensive manoeuvre. 
These results about the relationship between TSA accuracy and 
friendly losses complemented those of Sulistyawati et al. (2009) who 
also found losses to be negatively correlated with TSA when engaging 
enemy aircraft as a pair (lead and wingman). Furthermore, Fracker 
(1991) also observed only a weak correlation of SA with kills. Together, 
these results serve as a reminder that an appreciation of the nature of the 
task under consideration (in this case an air combat task) is vital when 
selecting the most appropriate measures of performance. Coupled with 
the observation that the relationship between (T)SA and performance 
may best be described as curvilinear rather than linear, this also pro-
vides an explanation for the frequently observed dissociation between 
SA and performance (Durso et al., 1998; Sulistyawati et al., 2009; 
Mansikka et al., 2019a). 
When further decomposing the TSA accuracy indices into TSA level 
1, 2 and 3 accuracy indices and examining their relationships with 
performance, it was observed that in all cases where friendly losses was 
the metric, all levels of TSA correlated highly with performance in all 
three TSA demand conditions (low, medium and high). The strongest 
correlations with performance were at the TSA level 1 (perception) and 
the weakest at the TSA level 3 (projection) – see Tables 5, 7 and 9. When 
performance was subject to prediction using multiple regression with 
the specific TSA level accuracies as predictors, as a result of the high 
inter-correlations between predictor variables, i.e., TSA levels 1, 2 and 3 
accuracy indices, only the TSA 1 level accuracy index entered into the 
regression equation in all cases. However, this is consistent with Ends-
ley’s underpinning theory (Endsley, 1995) as SA level 3 cannot be 
achieved unless the pilot has SA level 2, and similarly SA level 2 can only 
be attained if the pilot is already in possession of SA level 1. 
The technique for the assessment of TSA developed in the present 
study had the advantage of not interrupting the progression of the 
simulated sortie, thus it actually helped to maintain participants’ SA as 
the air combat picture developed and changed. Hence, in addition to 
virtual air combat simulations, it can also be used in live exercises. (T)SA 
is dynamic in nature, not static, and is built over a period of time. TSA 
was also assessed directly from participants and neither inferred from 
performance, which can be problematic as there is often a dissociation 
between (T)SA and performance, nor assessed from the observations of 
subject matter experts. The technique used in this paper acknowledged 
Endsley’s model of SA (Endsley, 1995) and was built upon a 
well-established knowledge elicitation method, i.e., CDM (see, e.g., 
Crandall et al., 2006; Plant and Stanton, 2015; Klein and Armstrong, 
2004). Even if the assessment of TSA is not the main concern in the 
debrief of an air combat mission, the proposed technique should serve as 
a good practice for any debrief by focusing the team’s attention to events 
and activities most relevant to TSA, and it is likely to add value to 
training simply by promoting reflection and constructive debate during 
the debrief. 
While this study focused in assessing TSA, it also has the potential to 
evaluate the pilots’ mental workload concurrently with the assessment 
of their SA and the flight’s TSA. This type of research is still required to 
draw a more holistic picture of SA and TSA, and how they are associated 
with, e.g., performance and mental workload. In addition, the proposed 
TSA measurement technique requires a skilled interviewer, and the pi-
lots must be motivated to be interviewed. Fortunately, in an air combat 
training environment, both requirements are typically met. 
It was observed that pilots had difficulties in attaining SA level 3 in 
the high cognitive demand combat mission, see Table 8. There were two 
primary reasons why it was easy for the flight members to build and 
maintain level 3 SA in the low cognitive demand condition. First, the 
flight members were able to almost constantly monitor the red aircraft 
manoeuvres from their cockpit displays. Second, as the red aircraft 
followed similar tactics to that the threat force typically uses in any 
western air combat exercise, it was a simple task for the flight members 
to anticipate the red aircraft’s manoeuvres based on their monitored 
track history. In the medium cognitive demand condition, building and 
maintaining SA level 3 was more challenging as only the radio calls and 
the flight members’ onboard sensor tracks contributed to the flight’s 
common tactical picture. Finally, when there was a high cognitive de-
mand required to develop TSA, each flight member had to build and 
maintain a three-dimensional tactical picture solely from the radio calls 
and their own onboard sensors. With only two radio channels available 
for simultaneous receipt and transmission, the frequencies soon became 
saturated. With the high cognitive demand condition being essentially 
data limited, the pilots had to conduct highly demanding mental simu-
lation to build and maintain a spatial model of the constantly changing 
tactical situation. As the level 3 TSA accuracy indices implied, this was a 
difficult or impossible task even for the qualified fighter pilots. 
6. Conclusions 
The results of this study indicated that there is a highly significant 
negative curvilinear, rather than linear, relationship between the TSA 
accuracy index and friendly losses at all levels of cognitive demand: the 
gains in performance decreased disproportionately with increases in 
TSA, with the greatest gains in performance observed with lower TSA 
accuracy. This relationship was revealed using a new TSA accuracy 
measurement technique designed for use in simulated air combat 
introduced and demonstrated in this paper. The technique views TSA as 
collective knowledge and based TSA accuracy measurement on a rec-
ognised knowledge elicitation method, i.e., CDM. By doing so, the 
technique avoided interrupting the task execution and enabled TSA to be 
assessed directly from the pilots attending the debriefs. 
In conclusion, this paper makes several contributions to ergonomics. 
First, it identifies attributes which are useful for other TSA studies in the 
air combat domain. In addition, the way the attributes were developed, 
will also be helpful when similar attributes are determined in other 
application domains. Second, it provides an explanation for the 
frequently observed dissociation between SA and performance in mili-
tary air missions; the relationship between SA/TSA and performance is 
likely to be curvilinear, not linear. The greatest performance benefits 
accrue with the initial gains in TSA. This can also be seen when the levels 
of TSA are used as predictors of combat performance: the strongest 
relationship with performance is at TSA level 1. At TSA levels 2 and 3, 
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TSA does not contribute significantly to predicting performance. Third, 
the introduced TSA accuracy measurement technique will be applicable 
for TSA accuracy assessment in any domain where the task cannot be 
interrupted for data collection. In such domains, the new technique 
could promote and aid TSA assessments carried out in the evaluation of 
training interventions and the utility of operating procedures, as well as 
in establishing the competence of teams and assessing the applicability 
of systems. 
Declaration of competing interest 
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial 
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence 
the work reported in this paper. 
References 
Atkinson, R., Shiffrin, R., 1968. Human memory: a proposed system and its control 
processes. In: Spence, K. (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: 
Advances in Research and Theory. Academic Press, New York, NY, pp. 89–195. 
Bolstad, C., Endsley, M., 2003. Measuring shared and team situation awareness in the 
army’s future objective force. Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. 47 (3), 
369–373. https://doi.org/10.1177/154193120304700325. 
Converse, S., Cannon-Bowers, J., Salas, E., 1991. Team member shared mental models: a 
theory and some methodological issues. Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 
Annual Meeting 35 (19), 1417–1421. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
154193129103501917. 
Cooke, N., 1994. Varieties of knowledge elicitation techniques. Int. J. Hum. Comput. 
Stud. 41 (6), 801–849. https://doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.1994.1083. 
Cooke, N., Salas, E., Cannon-Bowers, J., Stout, R., 2000. Measuring team knowledge. 
Hum. Factors 42 (1), 151–173. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872000779656561. 
Cooke, N., Stout, R., Salas, E., 1997. Broadening the measurement of situation awareness 
through cognitive engineering methods. Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. 
41 (1), 215–219. https://doi.org/10.1177/107118139704100149. 
Cooke, N., Stout, R., Salas, E., 2001. A knowledge elicitation approach to the 
measurement of team situation awareness. In: McNeese, M., Endsley, M., Salas, E. 
(Eds.), New Trends in Cooperative Activities: System Dynamics in Complex Settings. 
Human Factors, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 114–139. 
Cooke, N., Stout, R., Salas, E., 2017. A knowledge elicitation approach to the 
measurement of team situation awareness. In: Cooke, N., Stout, R., Salas, E. (Eds.), 
Situation Awareness. Routledge, London, pp. 157–182. https://doi.org/10.4324/ 
9781315087924. 
Cooper, G., Harper, R., 1969. The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of Aircraft 
Handling Qualities, Report No: NASA TN D-5153. Moffett Field. National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, Ames Research Center, CA.  
Crandall, B., Klein, G., Klein, G., Hoffman, R., 2006. Working Minds: A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Cognitive Task Analysis. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
Dekker, S., Hollnagel, E., 2004. Human factors and folk models. Cognit. Technol. Work 6 
(2), 79–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-003-0136-9. 
Durso, F., Hackworth, C., Truitt, T., Crutchfield, J., Nikolic, D., Manning, C., 1998. 
Situation awareness as predictor of performance for en-route air traffic controllers. 
Air Traffic Contr. Q 6 (1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.2514/ATCQ.6.1.1. 
Endsley, M., 1993. A survey of situation awareness requirements in air-to-air combat 
fighters. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 3 (2), 157–168. https://doi.org/10.1207/ 
s15327108ijap0302_5. 
Endsley, M., 1995. Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Hum. 
Factors 37 (1), 32–64. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049543. 
Endsley, M., 1998. Situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT). 
Proceedings of the IEEE 1988 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference 3, 
789–795. https://doi.org/10.1109/NAECON.1988.195097. 
Endsley, M., 2000. Situation models: an avenue to the modeling of mental models. Proc. 
Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. 44 (1), 61–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
154193120004400117. 
Endsley, M., 2015. Situation awareness: misconceptions and misunderstandings. Journal 
of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 9 (3), 4–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1555343415572631. 
Endsley, M., 2019. A systematic review and meta-analysis of direct objective measures of 
situation awareness: a comparison of SAGAT and SPAM. Hum. Factors 63 (1), 
124–150. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720819875376. 
Endsley, M., Garland, D. (Eds.), 1995. Experimental Analysis and Measurement of 
Situation Awareness. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press, Daytona Beach, 
FL. Retrieved from. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a522540.pdf.  
Endsley, M., Jones, W., 2001. A model of inter and intra-team situation awareness: 
implications for design, training and measurement. In: McNeese, M., Salas, E., 
Endsley, M. (Eds.), New Trends in Cooperative Activities: Understanding System 
Dynamics in Complex Environments. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa 
Monica, CA, pp. 46–67. 
Endsley, M., Sollenberger, R., Stein, E., 2000. Situation awareness: a comparison of 
measures. In: Endsley, M., Kaber, D. (Eds.), Proceedings Of the Human Performance, 
Situation Awareness And Automation: User Centered Design For the New Millennium 
Conference, 15–19. SA Technologies Inc, Savannah, GA.  
Falkland, E., Wiggins, M., 2019. Cross-task cue utilisation and situational awareness in 
simulated air traffic control. Appl. Ergon. 74, 24–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
apergo.2018.07.015. 
Flach, J.M., 1995. Situation awareness: proceed with caution. Hum. Factors 37 (1), 
149–157. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049480. 
Fiore, S., Ross, K., Jentsch, F., 2012. A Team cognitive readiness framework for small- 
unit training. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 6 (3), 325–349. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1555343412449626. 
Fowlkes, J., Lane, N., Salas, E., Franz, T., Oser, R., 1994. Improving the measurement of 
team performance: the TARGETs methodology. Mil. Psychol. 6 (1), 47–61. https:// 
doi.org/10.1207/s15327876mp0601_3. 
Fracker, M., 1991. Measures of Situation Awareness: an Experimental Evaluation. Report 
No. AL-TR-1991-0127. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Human Engineering 
Division, Armstrong Laboratory, OH.  
Gilbert, S., 2011. Models-based Science Teaching: Understanding and Using Mental 
Models. NSTA press, Arlington, VA.  
Gilson, R., Garland, D., Koonce, J. (Eds.), 1994. Situation Awareness in Complex 
Systems. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press, Daytona Beach, FL. Retrieved 
from. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a281448.pdf.  
Gorman, J., Cooke, N., Pederson, H., DeJoode, J., 2005. Coordinated awareness of 
situation by teams (CAST): measuring team situation awareness of a communication 
glitch. Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. 49 (3), 274–277. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/154193120504900313. 
Gorman, J., Cooke, N., Winner, J., 2006. Measuring team situation awareness in 
decentralized command and control environments. Ergonomics 49 (12–13), 
1312–1325. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140130600612788. 
Hecker, A., 2012. Knowledge beyond the individual? Making sense of a notion of 
collective knowledge in organization theory. Organ. Stud. 33 (3), 423–445. https:// 
doi.org/10.1177/0170840611433995. 
Harris, D., 2011. Human Performance on the Flight Deck. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 
Farnham, UK.  
Hoffman, R., Crandall, B., Shadbolt, N., 1998. Use of the critical decision method to elicit 
expert knowledge: a case study in the methodology of cognitive task analysis. Hum. 
Factors 40 (2), 254–276. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872098779480442. 
Hoffman, R., Shadbolt, N., Burton, A., Klein, G., 1995. Eliciting knowledge from experts: 
a methodological analysis. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 62 (2), 129–158. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1039. 
Joffe, A., Wiggins, M. Cross-task cue utilisation and situational awareness in learning to 
manage a simulated rail control task. Appl. Ergon., 89, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
apergo.2020.103216. 
Johnson, T., O’Connor, D., 2008. Measuring team shared understanding using the 
analysis-constructed shared mental model methodology. Perform. Improv. Q. 21 (3), 
113–134. https://doi.org/10.1002/piq.20034. 
Johnson-Laird, P., 1983. Mental Models: towards a Cognitive Science of Language, 
Inference, and Consciousness. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.  
Johnson, T., Lee, Y., Lee, M., O’Connor, D., Khalil, M., Huang, X., 2007. Measuring 
sharedness of team-related knowledge: design and validation of a shared mental 
model instrument. Hum. Resour. Dev. Int. 10 (4), 437–454. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/13678860701723802. 
Joint Chief of Staff, 2013. Joint Targeting. Joint Publication, pp. 3–60. 
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., Macgregor, D., 1989. Critical decision method for eliciting 
knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 19 (3), 462–472. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/21.31053. 
Klein, G., Armstrong, A., 2004. Critical decision method. In: Stanton, N., Brookhuis, K., 
Salas, E., Hendrik, H.W. (Eds.), Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Methods. CRC Press, London, UK, pp. 347–356. 
Klimoski, R., Mohammed, S., 1994. Team mental model: construct or metaphor? 
J. Manag. 20, 403–437. 
Krampell, M., Solís-Marcos, I., Hjalmdahl, M., 2020. Driving automation state-of-mind: 
using training to instigate rapid mental model development. Appl. Ergon. 83 https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2019.102986. 
Korean Air Force, 2005. Korean Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-3. Basic 
Employment Manual F16C. Retrieved from. http://falcon.blu3wolf.com/Docs/Basic- 
Employment-Manual-F-16C-RoKAF.pdf. 
Langan-Fox, J., Code, S., Langfield-Smith, K., 2000. Team mental models: techniques, 
methods, and analytic approaches. Hum. Factors 42 (2), 242–271. https://doi.org/ 
10.1518/001872000779656534. 
Langan-Fox, J., Anglim, J., Wilson, J., 2004. Mental models, team mental models, and 
performance: process, development, and future directions. Human Factors and 
Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries 14 (4), 331–352. https://doi.org/ 
10.1002/hfm.20004. 
Lichacz, F., 2006. An examination of situation awareness and confidence within a 
distributed information sharing environment. Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. 
Meet. 50 (3), 344–348. https://doi.org/10.1177/154193120605000328. 
Mansikka, H., Virtanen, K., Harris, D., 2019a. Dissociation between mental workload, 
performance, and task awareness in pilots of high performance aircraft. IEEE 
Transactions on Human-Machine Systems 49 (1), 1–9. https://doi:10.1109/ 
THMS.2018.2874186. 
Mansikka, H., Virtanen, K., Harris, D., Salomäki, J., 2019b. Live–virtual–constructive 
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